



ANALYZING THE CAUSES OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NATIONAL OIL MOVEMENT OF IRAN

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the causes of the rise and fall of the National Oil Movement of Iran. Every year, Esfand reminds us of a great memory for us Iranians. A sweet memory that we send our greetings to our fathers and mothers who fought for the freedom and independence of this land. Esfand 29 is a reminder of the good and the bad, which, like any historical event, also has bitter experiences; The failure of the unity between the leaders of the movement, the deception of doubt on March 29, brings back memories of Mesdaq and Kashani, the war for oil, economic pressure on the people, the Razm-Ara, the Hajir, and finally the bitter incident of August 19, 1953, in our minds, none of which are unrelated to the other. In this article, we aim to examine the factors that created the March 29 movement and show the connection between these factors in order to extract the bitter incident of August 19, 1953 from March 29.

Keywords: Causes of the emergence of the national movement, the national failure of Iranian oil, Mohammad Mossadegh, the Iranian-British Oil Company

1- Introduction

Our contemporary history is intertwined with the influence of the colonizers and their brokers to plunder the rich resources of Iranians by various methods, including creating conspiracies and bringing to power forces that protect their interests and concluding unilateral contracts such as the contracts of 1919, 1907, etc. They sucked the blood of Iranians. Meanwhile, Iran has always been of interest to colonial countries such as Russia and especially England due to its rich oil energy resources. They took advantage of the Iranians' weakness in oil extraction and began to suck up this resource by signing various contracts. Around 1945, whispers of nationalizing the oil industry were heard for the first time, but its serious plan was in 1949, which had serious domestic and foreign opponents; Prime Minister Razaray was a serious domestic opponent, and England was a serious foreign opponent who even sent a fleet to the Persian Gulf and threatened Iran militarily. The Iranian people resisted for more than 16 months and finally, under the leadership of Ayatollah Kashani, achieved the nationalization of the oil industry. Although the opponents were unable to achieve anything at first, they subsequently failed this great movement, which could have been a prelude to cutting off the hands of the colonialists, by creating divisions among national and religious groups. In this article, I seek to examine the causes of the creation and failure of national and religious groups.

1-1- Factors that created the movement

If we want to explain the factors that created this influential movement, we must definitely consider the two main groups that created the movement, the national and religious groups, each of which played its own role. But unfortunately, some people try to make one of the groups look insignificant without any reason. In this section, we try to briefly and historically mention the role of each.

The National Group: Certainly, one of the influential groups in this movement is the National Group led by Dr. Mohammad Sadeq. Contrary to what some people say, Mossadegh did not do anything to nationalize the oil industry until 1940. He has repeatedly spoken about the damage of the 1933 contract during the time of Reza Shah and its imposition, but what is necessary to remember here is that in his opinion this contract is legally invalid, because the person who signed the contract should have been free and the ministers during the dictatorship were crucified elements who only carried out the orders issued (Union of Islamic Student Associations in Europe, 1978, 1983). Mossadegh continued his activities in this field. But such activities could not be considered a serious obstacle for the colonialists. And during World War II, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company supplied about 50% of the fuel for British warships. After World War II, during the occupation by the Soviets, the condition for this country to leave Iran was to conclude an oil contract with Iran, but from the very beginning, when the Soviets presented their request, Dr. Mossadegh, in his first practical action in this field, presented a two-pronged plan to the parliament, which became a law on December 11, 1944 with the approval of the parliament. According to this law, any negotiations Official and unofficial oil concessions were banned. Mossadegh proposed to sell to the Soviet Union. At this time, various prime ministers who came to power one after the other considered solving the oil issue as their most important issue. At the beginning of 1948, after Qavam resigned, Hakimi became a prime minister who did not do any special work in this field. After him in June 1948, the Hejir government, although it was seeking negotiations in this field, did not do any special work. After Saed came to power, activities to solve this problem increased and Golshaian, the then Minister of Finance, held negotiations with Gas, one of the heads of the oil company. In this contract, they sought reforms regarding Iran's share and increasing Iran's role. At this time, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia had also signed contracts with foreign companies with a 50% share each, which in itself caused the parliamentarians to also seek to increase Iran's share of oil revenues. Finally, on July 16, 1949, an agreement called The Gas-Golshaian agreement was signed and submitted to the parliament for ratification. However, the ratification of this agreement was postponed until the 16th parliament, and members of the National Front led by Dr. Mossadegh were able to enter the 16th parliament, and members of the National Front B led by Dr. Mossadegh were able to enter the 16th parliament. This prepared the conditions for the rejection of the Gas-Golshaian agreement, which they believed was against Iran's interests. On the other hand, at the instigation of Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani, the people and students also announced their protest against this agreement. So that after the rejection of the annexation agreement bill, the popular movement for nationalizing oil gained momentum and the slogan of "everything for nationalization" became popular throughout the country. And on December 12, students supporting the National Front, triumphant over this slogan, held a large demonstration at the university. Mass students also came out with the slogan of unconditionally canceling the southern oil concession and clashed with students supporting nationalization. The masses of people supported the National Front, which led the protest against the company.

They had taken control of the oil and had successfully rejected the annexation bill. (Nejati; 65, 115) After the formation of the 16th Parliament on 1329 Khordad 22, 1940, the Gas-Golshaian oil bill was not considered sufficient to protect the rights of Iranians, and in the same session, the bill to nationalize the oil industry, which had been submitted to the Parliament by the Million, was rejected. However, the following month, the Parliament approved the opinion of the Oil Commission, but Razm Ara (then Prime Minister) strongly opposed the nationalization of the oil industry, including cooperation with Anglophile representatives, which was a major obstacle to the nationalization of this important industry, but in the end, the Fedayeen-e-Islam group assassinated Razm Ara by Khalil Tahmasbi. With the killing of Razm Ara, the affiliated representatives also withdrew, and the bill to nationalize the oil industry was approved in the Shura Parliament on 24 Esfand and then in the Senate on 29 Esfand. Ayatollah Kashani entered the 16th Parliament after returning from exile in Lebanon. He opposed the contract The additional decree of the Golshaian-Gulshaian government prepared a message that was read by Dr. Mossadegh in the parliament. The message stated that: "When the oil issue was raised, I considered it a religious and national duty to publish the opinion of the Iranian people regarding the atrocities of the oil company and the violated rights of the Iranian people in a declaration, and to demand the restoration of their lost rights and to express the people's opposition to any contract or action that the public is forced to confirm and approve.... Iranian oil belongs to the Iranian people and it can treat it in any way it wants...." (Mousavi, 79, 7 and Davani, 1360, 482) From this time on, other clerics and scholars from inside and outside Iran joined this movement and supported it. On the other hand, due to the very good reputation of Ayatollah Kashani, all scholars considered him to be their full-fledged representative in this process. For example, Ayatollah Khansari stated in his declaration: He wrote. (Although, like His Eminence, Ayatollah Kashani, may his life be blessed, he is a mujtahid They are just, courageous, compassionate and devoted to the interests of the worldly religion of the people. With all this seriousness, persuasion and clearance, they awaken the people. There is no more room for excuse for anyone.) In addition to encouraging the people to realize their rights, Ayatollah Kashani, through messages and speeches, or through training specific individuals or approving certain individuals, removed the obstacles to the nationalization of the oil industry with their help from the executive elements, namely Dr. Mossadegh. Among his students is Khalil Tahmasbi, who removed the most important and toughest internal obstacle by killing Razm Ara. On the other hand, with the prime ministership of Hejir, who was one of the toughest elements and opponents of the National Front entering the Sixteenth Parliament, he paved the way for Mossadegh and his associates to enter the Parliament.

1-2- The failure of the movement

Iran's oil was officially nationalized on March 10, and British employees immediately left the country, and oil revenues were maximally preserved for Iranians. However, this great movement, which can be considered the greatest national and popular movement after the Constitutional Revolution, failed on August 18, 1953, during an American-British coup. This failure was openly shown in the face of the executive, namely the Mossadegh government. Now, if we want to examine the factors of the failure of this movement, we must divide them into two general categories.

1- External factors 2- Internal factors

2-1- External factors

Before and after the nationalization of the oil industry, the behavior of countries that saw themselves in this issue in some way was different. Since each country seeks its own interests, colonial countries also sought to plunder other countries; At this time, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were at the forefront of this movement.

A- Britain

The British government, which initially knew very little about its relationship with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, apparently did not support this company. During the nationalization of the oil industry, it tried very hard to defeat this movement. Its efforts began in the form of negotiations with the government and the prime minister, and eventually turned into military threats. Certainly, one of the most effective factors in postponing the nationalization of oil was the relentless pressure of the British government. That country announced in a statement: "The British government cannot remain indifferent to the affairs of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which is an important British and even international institution. Therefore, the British government has learned with concern that the Oil Commission of the Parliament has considered nationalizing this institution before the end of its concession period" (Safari, 1992, 427). Finally, when this bill was passed by both chambers and the internal English elephants of the Parliament could not do anything, they resorted to force and "the ships Mauritius and Flamco and the land, sea and air forces concentrated near and far on the Iranian borders resorted to the weapon of threat, but this weapon did not overthrow the Mossadegh government, which was based on the stability and resistance of the Iranian nation, and therefore Britain was forced to implement a long-term plan" (Union of Islamic Student Associations in Europe; 1978, 100); Plans such as insinuating that Iranians were incompetent in managing oil affairs or taking this case to the Hague Tribunal and putting pressure on the Mossadegh government, but such conspiracies did not yield results in the first months. Perhaps the need for other factors such as American opposition and breaking internal unity was necessary for the conspiracy to succeed.

B- America

Contrary to the ideas of many analysts who consider America, especially after World War I, to be a peace-loving country, it must be said that America also sought such a concession in Iran after the 1933 agreement. However, the history of British influence prevented them from directly entering the Iranian political scene. This also initially caused them to support the nationalization of the oil industry, but after Mossadegh and Kashani's influence increased among the people and all the interests of colonial countries, including America, were jeopardized, this country joined the ranks of opponents of the movement. Of course, in addition to the above factor, other factors such as the victory of the communists in China had made American officials skeptical of nationalist movements. On the other hand, the excuse of the threat to the country by the communists, which Mossadegh tried to use to align the Americans with him, backfired, and America, faced with the increasing stubbornness of the Tudeh Party, saw the danger of communism as too great to be eliminated with Mossadegh's help (Maabedi, 2002, 34). Therefore, during the coup against the movement, all the money for this was provided by America, so that this coup was called the "American coup".

C) The Soviet Union An important and interesting point is the secret and sometimes overt support of the Soviet Union as a rival of England in this process. The Soviet Union, which was dissatisfied with Mossadegh and his activities, could not support the National Front and the

movement. One of the main reasons for their opposition to Mossadegh was the proposed Qavam-Sadchikov agreement they had in mind (an agreement in which the Soviet Union left Iran in exchange for the oil of the North, but after the withdrawal, this agreement did not pass a vote in the parliament). The Soviets were not happy with such nationalist activities led by Mossadegh and on the other hand they considered such activities to be an obstacle to the spread of communism in Iran. Another reason why the Soviets were dissatisfied with the nationalization process was that they considered Mossadegh to be the representative of America in Iran. They were very afraid of the entry of a third force like America into Iran, which is why they agreed to support England. The Tudeh Party sought to fulfill the Soviet goals in Iran in various ways and with the insidious policies and procedures it had adopted in those years. During the coup, even though a large number of Tudeh army officers (and ostensibly opposed to the British) did not show any movement in supporting Mossadegh, and this factor is also considered one of the factors that led to the failure of the movement.

2-2 - Internal factors

As mentioned, its leaders played an active role during this movement. For this reason, the weakness of this influential group had a destructive effect on this movement. Unfortunately, the leaders of this movement, namely Ayatollah Kashani and Mossadegh, showed weaknesses that cannot be ignored despite their efforts. So that it can be said that if the support and harmony of the leaders of the National Oil Movement, namely Ayatollah Kashani as the religious leader and the National Front and Dr. Mossadegh as the political leader, had continued, perhaps the coup of 11 August would not have taken place (Amini, 1979, 75). After Mossadegh entered the parliament with the support of the Fedayeen of Islam and religious forces led by Ayatollah Kashani, who somehow removed obstacles from his path, and later, with their support, he became prime minister again in the uprising of 11 Tir, he stopped supporting them after a while. It was at this point that the conflict of ideas showed itself and Mossadegh's secular thoughts could not tolerate the interference of religious forces in the political affairs of the country. For this reason, at times, he dealt them blows that prevented their growth. Among these cases, we can recall Mossadegh's lack of support for the Fedayeen of Islam, when they were in captivity and were in dire need of Mossadegh's support. Among other cases, we can recall Mossadegh's failure to accept the advice of Ayatollah Kashani in the days before the coup. Ayatollah Kashani, although he adhered to the political ideas of his teachers, even considered the lack of attention of the clergy to the Majlis and Parliament to be one of the important causes of the difficulties of society and the clergy (Madani, 1369, 118).

When he was accepted as the speaker of the parliament, he did not participate in the sessions of the parliament. This in itself weakened the current. In general, it can be said that ((Ayatollah Kashani and Dr. Mossadegh were two personalities with two different bases. Kashani was a militant personality in non-critical opportunities. For Ayatollah Kashani, the destruction of colonialism throughout the world was a principle, but Mossadegh was the percentage of resolving disputes with England for the interests of Iran, but Kashani considered the destruction of colonialism as a prelude to the flourishing of Islam)) (Zariri, 2005, 117). But it seems that with the conditions that the country was in at that time, paying attention to the interior of Iran and the growth of the intellectual and cultural beliefs of the people was more important, so that Imam Khomeini also said in this regard: ((During the Kashani movement and Dr. Mossadegh,

the political aspect of the movement was stronger, in a letter I wrote to Kashani that it was necessary to give importance to the religious aspect of the movement, but instead of strengthening the religious aspect and giving dominance to the political aspect, he acted the opposite way)) ((Esmaili; 2007, 281)

3- Conclusion

Internal reasons for the creation Before and after the nationalization of the oil industry, the actions of the countries that saw themselves involved in this issue were different. Since each country seeks its own interests, the colonial countries also sought to plunder other countries; at this time, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were at the forefront of this trend. On the afternoon of August 18, a number of Tehran thugs, with the support of money they had received from the Americans and with the hope that the soldiers would work They have no business! They changed the situation in Tehran and attacked the house of Dr. Mossadegh, the then Prime Minister. This time, unlike two days ago when a suspicious coup was thwarted overnight by the Prime Minister, Dr. Mossadegh showed no reaction and, in the midst of the disbelief of all the people, the government fell and the Shah, who had fled abroad, returned to Iran with a message from Fazlallah Zahedi, Mossadegh's successor. A great movement that had been continued by the masses of the people and led by two great individuals. It was so easy to be defeated by the intervention of foreigners and the weakness of domestic forces. A movement that could have pushed the Iranian freedom movement forward by 25 years and saved them from the yoke of arrogance and colonialism. But what is important in this historical movement is the lesson that must be learned. It should be known that the people are the religion of their rulers. In this movement too, as long as there was no degeneration and division among the leaders, the people also knew their way and supported the national and religious leaders. But when division arose among the leaders, the people also dispersed. And from the same people who came out to support Mossadegh on Tir 31, there were people who cursed him. On the other hand, this movement, despite its clear anti-colonial policies, could not convince the people of its general goal and ideal. There were vague questions in the minds of the people that needed to be answered. Questions such as whether at this time they should support a religious leader or a prime minister or even Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi!!!? But despite all this, perhaps it would still take 25 years for a leader to emerge from among the masses of the nation who would speak their minds and gather them all under one banner and have disciples who would explain the goal of the movement to the people.

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